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ABSTRACT1 
This paper presents the research work carried 
out in the GEOCAST project, funded within 
the European 5th Framework IST programme. 
It describes the challenges when using 
satellites for IP multicast, concerning 
networking technologies, satellite 
communications payload, IP multicast 
protocols, the role of satellites in the network 
and, in particular, the paper focuses on 
security. There are various security standards 
such as DVB-S, DVB-RCS, ATM and IPSec 
that can be applied to satisfy some of the user 
and network requirements. The paper provides 
an overview of these issues and the possible 
interaction between them. Then it examines in 
detail the topic of securing very large multicast 
groups, where the group size and group 
dynamics have great impact on networks and 
network security. It also presents key 
management distribution systems and a 
satellite key distribution architecture. 
1 Introduction 
In recent years, significant research and 
development has been carried out in satellite 
networking technologies and applications such 
as ATM over satellite for broadband networks, 
IP over satellite for Internet access and 
interconnection, on-board processing and 
switching, and Digital Video Broadcasting – 
Satellite (DVB-S) and DVB interactive Return 
Channel via Satellite (DVB-RCS). 
In addition to the traditional file and web page 
transfer with best-effort services in the 
Internet, research and development has been 
focusing on supporting real-time multimedia 
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and multicast applications with quality of 
services (QoS).   
Research has been carried out in the area of IP 
multicast over satellites, particularly over 
GEO satellites, within the European IST 
programme [IST000], Multicast Over 
Geostationary EHF Satellites (GEOCAST) 
project [GEOC00] supported by the EU 5th 
framework programme.  This project is 
investigating the potential of satellites for IP 
multicast applications, due to the natural 
characteristics of satellites’ wide coverage and 
broadcast capabilities.  These characteristics 
have already led to the success of satellite 
applications in broadband access networks, 
broadband transit networks, and digital 
satellite broadcast services.  
The challenge of security in GEO satellite 
environments is considered to be one of the 
main obstacles to the widespread deployment 
of satellite IP multicast and multimedia 
applications [CRUI98].  The main problem is 
that eavesdropping and active intrusion is 
much easier than in terrestrial fixed or mobile 
networks because of the broadcast nature of 
satellites.  In addition, satellite channels 
experience long delays and high bit error rates, 
which may cause the loss of security 
synchronisation.  This demands a careful 
evaluation of encryption systems to prevent 
Quality of Service (QoS) degradation because 
of security processing. Also the number of 
members in a multicast group can be very 
large and change dynamically. 
This paper discusses these issues based on 
work from the GEOCAST project. First, in 
section 2 the paper discusses general satellite 
networking architectures and technologies 
including IP, ATM, DVB, and on-board 
processing and switching.  Sections 3, 4 and 5 
respectively discuss DVB, ATM and IP 
security systems.  Section 5 discusses 
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multicast key management issues. Finally, 
section 6 concludes this paper. 
2 Satellite IP networking and 
multicast 
Satellite IP networking and multicast issues 
concern several related areas. These include 
services and applications and their QoS 
requirements and suitable network protocols.  
The discussion here is focused on IP multicast 
related issues and their relationship rather than 
a detailed description of these topics. 
2.1 Network applications and 
services 
Two main categories for broadband services 
have been specified from the network 
perspective: interactive services and 
distribution services. The interactive services 
are subdivided into three classes of services:  
• Conversational services: Typical 
examples are video telephony, video-
conferences, video/audio information 
transmission, high speed digital 
information, file and document 
transfer;  
• Message services: Typical examples 
are video mail and document mail; and  
• Retrieval services: Typical examples 
are video, high-resolution image, 
document and data.  
The distribution services are subdivided into 
two classes: 
• The class without user individual 
representation control, such as TV, 
multimedia video and audio 
distribution; and  
• The class with user individual 
representation control, such as Pay TV 
(PTV).  
From the user’s perspective, satellite IP 
multicast should support existing multicast 
applications such as reliable file transfer, data 
distribution and multimedia streaming 
including video, voice and data.  
All these services may have different QoS 
requirements such as jitter sensitive real time 
or loss sensitive transaction data. 
The value added services provided by 
satellites include extended coverage and 
efficient delivery to a large number of users on 
a large scale. The satellite link can play 
different roles in the network: 
• Last mile connections: End users are 
directly connected to the satellite to 
provide direct forward and return 
links. Traffic sources connect to the 
satellite feeder or hub stations through 
the Internet, tunnelling, dial-up links, 
etc. 
• First mile connections: The satellite 
provides forward and return link 
connections directly to a large number 
of ISPs’ or other service providers’ 
gateways, which will deliver the IP 
packet onward to the end users. As 
with the last mile connections, traffic 
sources connect to the satellite feeder 
or hub stations through the Internet, 
tunnelling, dial-up links, etc. 
• Transit connections: The satellite 
provides connections between Internet 
gateways or ISPs’ gateways. The 
traffic is routed through the satellite 
links according to specified routing 
protocols and defined link metrics in 
the networks so as to minimise 
connection costs and to meet required 
QoS constraints for the given traffic 
sources. 
Figure 1 gives an example how satellite can be 
used to support these types of connections, 
where Interior Gateway Routers (IGR) are 
used to route traffic within a single domain 
and Border Gateway Routers (BGR) are used 
between different domains. 
2.2 Network protocols and 
internetworking 
Internet protocols provide a uniform support to 
all the different services and applications 
across different technologies, such as LAN, 
MAN, WAN and satellite links. IP packets 
have to be encapsulated and transported across 
different networks. In a satellite environment, 
these can be traditional transparent data links, 
or broadband links based on ATM or DVB-
S/DVB-RCS. 
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The Internet community has developed some 
mechanisms at the transport layer to provide a 
basic level of QoS. Traditionally, TCP is used 
for reliable connection oriented services and 
UDP for best effort connectionless services at 
transport level.  
In addition to the best effort service provided 
by the IP network level protocol, new 
mechanisms such as DiffServ and IntServ have 
been developed to support QoS. In the 
DiffServ architecture, services are given 
different priority and resource allocations so 
that various types of QoS can be supported. In 
the IntServ architecture, resources have to be 
reserved for individual services. Given the 
large number of services that have to be 
supported in the network, resource reservation 
for individual services does not scale well in 
large networks. 
Flow-based techniques such as Multi-Protocol 
Label Switch (MPLS) have also been 
developed to combine layer 2 and layer 3 
functions to support QoS requirements.  
Important network performance parameters 
include end-to-end delay, delay variation and 
packet loss. These have to be measured in an 
end-to-end reference path, where the 
propagation delay of satellite links has to be 
taken into account properly. 
2.3 Satellite systems and 
technologies 
Satellite systems and technologies concern two 
aspects: the ground segment and the space 
segment. In the ground segment, there are 
several constraints such as physical limitation, 
access, and trade-offs between transmission 
power, data rate and mobility. In the space 
segment, various types of payload can be used 
for communication links, such as transparent 
(bent-pipe), on-board processing, on-board 
packet switching (including ATM) and 
recently on-board DVB switching.  
Transparent satellite links provide data link 
layer connections, where on-board signalling 
and control are minimal, but they may not 
provide optimised resource utilisation. On-
board processing and switching satellites can 
provide optimised resource utilisation, but at 
the cost of complexity of on-board signalling 
and control. All these satellite systems can 
support IP protocols. 
Future satellites with on-board DVB switching 
can integrate broadcasting and interactive 
services by combining DVB-S and DVB-RCS 
standards. Figure 2 shows a DVB regenerative 
payload, based on work conducted in the 
DOMINO-2 ESA programme. It performs the 
multiplexing of information from diverse 
sources into a standard DVB-S stream 
[LAMA01].  Another example of DVB on-
board switching is the DILAN architecture for 
interconnecting of Local Area Networks 
(LANs) with IP over MPEG-2 encapsulation, 
using the regenerative STENTOR satellite 
payload [CLAV01]. 
The GEOCAST project can be based on either 
a transparent satellite system or a satellite 
system with on-board processing and 
switching capabilities. The forward link is 
based on DVB-S/MPEG-2 and the return link 
on DVB-RCS or ATM. The transparent 
satellite system provides a simple solution to 
support a mono-spotbeam star topology for 
networking. The on-board processing and 
switching satellite system has additional 
functionality, being capable of supporting 
multiple spotbeam star and mesh topology. It 
is also more flexible, with better utilisation of 
satellite bandwidth resources. 
2.4 IP multicast over satellite 
The development and investment in broadband 
communications and networks over satellite in 
recent years has been mainly based on three 
approaches: bent-pipe, ATM or ATM-like fast 
packet technology, and DVB for broadcasting.  
None of these were originally designed to 
support IP multicast, but they have now been 
adapted to support IP multicast over satellites. 
Therefore, there are now several obvious 
options to support IP, depending on the 
available satellite systems and technologies: 
(1) IP over bent-pipe satellite, (2) IP over 
ATM, and (3) IP over DVB.  The first option 
is based on simple technology and a large 
number of satellites in operation are available 
for IP connections.  The second option will 
have to find solutions that enable ATM to 
support IP multicast and exploit the benefit of 
ATM.  The third option will have to find 
solutions that support IP multicast over DVB; 
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these will explore the benefit of DVB 
technology, but may support only one-way 
communications or may have satellite return 
channels or terrestrial return channels. 
If networks evolve towards an all-IP solution, 
a further option needs to be investigated: an 
all-IP satellite with on-board router. Such an 
option will need a significant amount of new 
system design, such as replacing the ATM and 
DVB switching with an on-board router, and 
will need to convince industry to develop and 
deploy satellite payload systems based on the 
new router technology instead of existing 
technologies.  This may lose the benefits of 
ATM and DVB-S, which are already available.  
The benefit of an IP-router-in-the-sky 
approach is that the routing algorithm can be 
used to integrate the satellite links in an IP 
multicast routing tree at the source, trunk or 
end branch, as first mile connections, transit 
connections or last mile connections.  
To reflect the requirements of different types 
of services and applications, IP multicast over 
satellite should address the topic of security, 
which is important for the widespread use of 
multicast and its commercial success.  This 
subject is considered in the remainder of this 
paper.  
3 Security systems in DVB-S 
and DVB-RCS 
Security in general is intended to protect the 
user identity including its exact location, the 
signalling traffic to and from the user, data 
traffic to and from the user and the 
operator/user against use of the network 
without appropriate authority and subscription. 
In DVB, two levels of security can be applied:  
• DVB common scrambling as 
described in section 3.1; 
• Individual user scrambling in the 
forward and return link as described in 
section 3.2;  
In addition, security can be applied in the 
application, transport and network layers.  
Application and transport layer security are 
not discussed in this paper.  However, section 
5 discusses IPSec in the context of network 
layer security. 
Although the user/service provider could use 
its own security systems above the data link 
layer, it may be desirable to provide a security 
system at the data link layer so that the 
satellite link is secure without recourse to 
additional measures.  Link level security is 
particularly desirable by satellite access 
network operators in order to secure satellite 
links and provide their clients (such as ISPs) 
with data confidentiality. 
For DVB, the satellite interactive network 
forward link is based on the DVB/MPEG-TS 
Standard.  The security concept is shown in 
Figure 3, which taken from [ETSI00]. 
3.1 Conditional Access in DVB-S 
Conditional access (CA) is a service that 
allows broadcasters to restrict certain 
programming products to certain viewers. The 
CA does this by encrypting the broadcaster’s 
programmes. Consequently, the programmes 
must be decrypted at the receiving end before 
they can be decoded for viewing. 
CA offers capabilities such as Pay TV (PTV), 
interactive features such as video-on-demand 
(VOD) and games, the ability to restrict access 
to certain material (such as movies) and the 
ability to direct messages to specific set-top 
boxes (perhaps based on geographic region). 
DVB Conditional Access (CA) originated as a 
broadcast security mechanism that allows a 
source to determine which individual receivers 
are able to receive particular broadcast 
programmes.  CA requires two principal 
functions: (a) the ability to encode (or 
“scramble”) a transmission and decode it (or 
“descramble”) at the receiver, and (b) the 
ability to specify which receivers are capable 
of descrambling the transmission.  
As Figure 4 shows, the transmission from a 
source to all receivers comprises a set of 
scrambled MPEG components (video, audio, 
data); Entitlement Control Messages (ECMs, 
session keys); and Entitlement Management 
Messages (EMMs, service keys).  The ECMs 
identify the CA services, and for each CA 
service carry the control word (CW), in an 
encrypted form, and any other parameters 
required to access the service.  The entitlement 
management messages (EMM) are a set of 
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messages that identify the entitlements 
(permissions) of any individual user. 
In addition, a Subscriber Management System 
(SMS) maintains and stores commercial 
aspects of customer relationship (registration, 
granting of entitlements, invoicing, and 
accounting), and the Subscriber Authorisation 
System (SAS) encrypts codewords and 
delivers them to the descrambler. 
At the receiving end, it is the job of the Set-
Top Box (STB) to descramble the CA 
encryption and decode the MPEG-2 streams 
for viewing. Each packet has associated with it 
(in its header) a program identifier (PID). The 
Conditional Access Table (CAT) has a well-
known PID value = 1. This table can be used 
to identify the PID values of the transport 
packets containing the EMMs. The demux 
processor also constructs the Program Map 
Table (PMT) from non-encrypted packets; this 
gives the PID values of all the transport 
streams associated with a particular 
programme. Private data associated with the 
programme can also be included in this table - 
for example, the PID value of the packets that 
contain ECMs. All these tables (signalling 
messages) are transmitted in the clear, which 
is an inherent security weakness in DVB-S 
systems.  
3.2 DVB-RCS security 
The DVB-RCS standard provides much more 
advanced security procedures (in comparison 
to DVB-S CA) for satellite terminal 
authentication and key exchanges with the 
Network Control Centre (NCC).   
DVB-RCS security can be divided into two 
phases:  Phase 1 is the authentication during 
the logon procedure.  During this phase a 
security session key is agreed between the 
satellite terminal and the NCC. The end user 
satellite terminal in the GEOCAST project is 
referred to as a User Earth Station (UES).  In 
phase 2, the session key is used for the 
encryption of all subsequent messages 
between UES and NCC. The authentication is 
based on a long-term secret shared between 
NCC and UES, called a cookie. The cookie is 
160 bits long and stored in non-volatile storage 
(such as smart cards). The NCC maintains a 
database of the cookie values of the UESs on 
its network. Cookie values can be updated 
occasionally as dictated by security policy, but 
they are less vulnerable than session keys. 
Anti-cloning measures can also be 
implemented using message sequence 
numbering.  The DVB-RCS standard allows a 
Quick, Explicit and Main key exchanges.  In 
the GEOCAST system, the Main key exchange 
has been chosen because it allows the UES 
cookie to be updated. 
Figure 5 shows the message flows during 
logon. In summary, the messages are as 
follows: 
• Logon: The UES indicates its 
intention to connect to the satellite 
network. 
• Security sign-on: The NCC indicates 
which cryptographic algorithms it 
supports, as the initial stage of a 
security negotiation. 
• Security sign-on response: The UES 
responds by specifying the specific 
algorithms and parameters it will use, 
chosen from the list presented by the 
NCC. 
• Main key exchange: This message and 
the following enable the NCC and 
UES to use a public key algorithm to 
agree a shared secret. 
• Main key exchange response: The 
second message enables the parameter 
values of the public key algorithm to 
be calculated. 
A further consideration is security of the space 
segment.  In satellite systems with DVB on-
board switching such as DOMINO-2 
[LAMA01], message integrity between the 
NCC and the OBP is important in order to 
make sure that configuration messages 
originate from the NCC. The major constraint 
in the OBP is its limited memory and 
computational power, since the computational 
cost of message integrity can be high.  This 
depends on the type of algorithms used.  For 
example, message integrity can be provided 
using public-key digital signatures, which are 
computationally heavy, or using MAC 
(Message Authentication Code) with secret 
keys, which is lighter.  The use of secret keys 
implies the need for a key agreement, where 
keys can be stored in the OBP at installation 
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time or agreed using the DVB-RCS key 
exchange mechanisms.  
3.3 DVB-S and IP multicast security 
DVB-S conditional access is used today for 
digital broadcasting over satellite and can be 
used to secure multicast communications over 
satellites at the MPEG-TS level.  In DVB-S, IP 
packets are encapsulated in an Ethernet style 
header called Multi Protocol Encapsulation 
(MPE), where the IP address can be associated 
with the MPEG-TS PID.  IP multicast can also 
be encapsulated with MPE. Descrambling in 
DVB-S is programme based, where a whole 
programme will be scrambled with the same 
CW.  The programme may contain video, 
audio and data, each with a specific PID.  The 
main drawback is that DVB-S scrambling 
system favours a centralised ECM and EMM 
and its use for securing dynamically changing 
IP multicast groups is limited. 
On the other hand, the DVB-RCS standard 
provides more advanced security procedures 
for satellite terminal authentication and key 
exchanges with the satellite network operator.  
However it does not provide security 
procedures for terminal-to-terminal 
communications.  The DVB-RCS standard 
allows the use of ATM cell transmission over 
satellites.  Hence for satellite ATM networks, 
terminal-to-terminal communications and 
multicasting can be secured using the ATM 
security system as discussed in section 4. 
4 Satellite ATM security 
systems 
4.1 Technical challenges in GEO 
satellites 
ATM security, as defined by the ATM Forum 
Security Working Group, is modelled after the 
ATM protocol reference model, which is 
divided into three planes: user, control, and 
management [ATMF01]. The ATM Forum 
security specification applies to virtual 
channel connections (VCCs) and virtual path 
connections (VPCs) for both point-to-point 
and point-to-multipoint connections. The 
ATM Forum defines the support of the 
following security services in the user plane: 
• Entity authentication. 
• Key exchange. 
• Data confidentiality. 
• Data integrity. 
• Access control.  
According to the ATM security specifications 
either the two-way or three-way security 
message exchange (SME) protocols may be 
used to establish the above mentioned security 
services. These SMEs can either be signalling 
or inband based. Security negotiation 
parameters can only be exchanged using the 
three-way SME. For unicast connections, 
either the three-way SME or two-way SME 
can be used to set up security associations. For 
the first “leaf” of a multicast connection, 
again, either the three-way or two-way SME 
can be used; for subsequent leaves, only the 
two-way SME can be used. 
The ATM Forum security specifications state 
that for the data confidentiality service the 
ATM cell-level approach is used to encrypt the 
payload, and the header is left in the clear. The 
data integrity service is provided at the AAL 
level (rather than the ATM layer). Once a 
connection is established, keys for integrity 
and confidentiality services are negotiated 
using the three-way or two-way SME. 
However, when a key is used to provide 
confidentiality and integrity protection, the 
probability of successfully “cracking” the key 
increases with time. To prevent such an attack 
from being successful, keys must be changed 
periodically. To this end, a “session key 
update” procedure has been defined to support 
periodic key changeover. This procedure uses 
a master key, which is used to encrypt short-
lived session keys; these in turn are used for a 
period of time for integrity and confidentiality 
services. The master key and first session key 
are exchanged during initial security 
negotiation. However, subsequent session keys 
must be transferred in the data channel so that 
the receiver may load them and start using 
them at the appropriate time.  
The method for session key update, as 
described in the ATM security specification, 
consists of two processes: exchanging a new 
session key between the initiator and 
responder, and changing over from the old 
session key to the new session key. The first 
process is referred to as “session key 
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exchange” (SKE) and the second process is 
referred to as “session key changeover” 
(SKC). The process of performing key updates 
is independent in each direction of data flow, 
for full duplex connections. It is the 
responsibility of the source (i.e. the encrypting 
side of the data confidentiality service) of each 
data flow to initiate the key update in its 
direction. 
4.2 ATM and IP multicast security 
challenges  
There are two important performance related 
considerations to be made when designing any 
ATM security system: 
• ATM throughput: The encryption unit 
has to be fast and handle the full bi-
directional data rates. 
• Statistical multiplexing: Unique 
session keys are required for each VC.  
This requires that the cryptographic 
unit must be capable of changing the 
keys rapidly (a key agile system).  
Research in key agility has shown that 
one encryption unit for each direction 
can be sufficient. 
Some challenges for IP multicast over ATM 
regarding key management are: 
• Rekeying in ATM using SKC/SKE is 
performed in the data channel i.e. in 
the VC (in-band), while IP multicast 
systems often have a separate channel 
for key distribution e.g. using a 
different multicast address (out-of-
band). 
• The SKC/SKE protocols use a single 
ATM cell for rekeying.  The size of 
the ATM cell restricts the use of 
sophisticated rekeying algorithms such 
as Logical Key Hierarchy [LKHW99], 
which are needed for scalability 
reason in large multicast groups.  LKH 
is examined in section 5. 
• There is no true provisioning for 
multicast connectivity in ATM. 
4.3 Geocast satellite ATM system  
In the GEOCAST project ATM satellite 
scenario, a typical connectivity example is that 
a UES establishes a connection with a 
Gateway Earth Station (GES). Each UES will 
use the three-way in-band SME to establish a 
secure unicast connection with the GES. After 
the satellite unicast ATM connection is set up, 
the user may try to join an existing or a new 
multicast group. In order to provide security 
services for the multicast group the ATM 
Forum security two-way signalling SME will 
be used.  We assume that the GES generates 
the multicast session key KSESSION_MULTICAST 
and master key KCONTROL_MULTICAST and sends 
them to the UES.  Moreover no security 
negotiation will take place since the GES will 
use a common cryptographic algorithm for 
data encryption. If the user is joining a new 
multicast group then the GES will generate the 
keys and send them to the UES. On the other 
hand, if the user is joining an existing group 
the GES only needs send the current multicast 
keys to the UES. 
The rekey protocol is initiated by the GES, 
since the GES generates the initial session 
keys in both the unicast and multicast 
connections. The GES will use the SKC and 
SKE protocols to send the new session key 
(KSESSION_MULTICAST_NEW) via multicast to the 
group.  This key is encrypted with the control 
key (KCONTROL_MULTICAST) of the given multicast 
group.  
5 Satellite IP multicast 
security systems  
The security architecture of the Internet 
Protocol known as IP security (IPSec) is the 
most advanced effort in the standardization of 
Internet security. The IPSec protocol suite is 
used to provide inter-operable 
cryptographically based security services (i.e. 
confidentiality, authentication, integrity, and 
non-repudiation) at the IP layer [ATKI98]. It is 
composed of an authentication protocol: 
Authentication Header (AH), and a 
confidentiality protocol: Encapsulated 
Security Payload (ESP). 
It is possible to use AH or ESP or 
combinations of both over satellites in 
transport or tunnel modes to provide network 
level security.  This is in contrast to the DVB 
and ATM systems, which provide link layer 
security.  The ESP tunnel mode provides the 
best security, however the addition of a new IP 
 8 
header (20 bytes) is a large overhead.  The 
security key has to be agreed between the 
sender and recipient before using AH or ESP.  
For example this can be used with IP over 
MPEG-2 encapsulation in the DILAN 
architecture described in [CLAV01]. 
5.1 IP multicast security 
In secure IP multicast, the group size and 
group dynamics have a great impact on the key 
management distribution system, especially for 
large groups. There are many architectures for 
key management, one of them is based on the 
IETF key management draft [HARD00]. In 
order to support multicast groups; the domain 
is divided into a number of administratively 
scoped “areas”.  A host-member of a multicast 
group is defined to reside within one (and only 
one) of these areas.  The purpose of placing 
host-members in areas is to achieve flexible 
and efficient key management, particularly in 
the face of the problem of changes (joins and 
leaves) in the membership of a multicast 
group. 
In [IYEN01] we investigated the idea of 
defining the satellite network as a single 
domain, which can be divided into 
administratively scoped areas.  Each area 
could be mapped into a single spot beam.  
Area control keys are used to distribute session 
keys.  However it seems the overheads of 
rekeying due to group membership changes are 
high in terms of satellite transmissions. 
Therefore the remainder of this section 
discusses the alternative approach of the 
Logical Key Hierarchy [LKHW99] 
5.2 Multicast rekeying issues 
Confidentiality is ensured by encrypting traffic 
sent over the satellite links using a key, 
referred to here as the group key (this is 
identical in function to the session key defined 
in the ATM Forum specifications). Rekeying 
occurs for the following reasons: 
(1) The group key is updated regularly 
(typically every few seconds or minutes) 
to reduce the probability of successful 
cryptanalysis of the encrypted traffic. 
(2) The group key may also need to be 
changed on demand if it is determined that 
the key has been compromised. 
(3) Rekeying may be required when a new 
user joins the multicast group.  This 
ensures that the user cannot decrypt 
encoded traffic that was sent prior to their 
joining (this is called reverse secrecy). 
(4) Rekeying may be required when an 
existing user departs from the multicast 
group.  This ensures that the user cannot 
decrypt encoded traffic that is sent after 
they leave (this is called forward secrecy). 
For large multicast groups that have frequent 
membership changes the cost of rekeying can 
be significant, since satellite resources are 
expensive.  Scalable rekeying is therefore an 
important problem that needs to be considered 
in order to support secure communications for 
large dynamic groups.  We now proceed to 
investigate rekey techniques for each of the 
four functions listed above. 
Several techniques exist for rekeying (1) and 
(3) above: two options are for the new group 
key to be encrypted with either (a) the old 
group key, or (b) a separate “control” key 
negotiated during session establishment (this 
latter is the approach adopted by the ATM 
Forum, and described in section 4). 
For (2) and (4) above a different rekeying 
approach is required since the old key is 
known by at least one user who is no longer to 
be a recipient of the multicast transmission.  
We assume that as each user joins, a unique 
pairwise key is shared between the source and 
the user.  If the group key is then changed the 
new group key is encrypted with each user’s 
unique pairwise key and then unicast to that 
user.  Thus for N users a total of N encrypted 
keys are generated and transmitted across the 
satellite network (Figure 6a).  The 
disadvantages of this approach are that it does 
not scale well for the large multicast groups 
that a satellite system can be expected to cater 
for, and it is expensive in its use of satellite 
network resources. 
A hierarchical tree [LKHW99] provides a 
more scalable approach.  Here a tree of keys is 
used (the keys are labelled A though O in 
Figure 6b).  If a user departs from the group, 
say user 11, then it is only necessary to rekey 
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keys F, K, N and the group key O.  This 
requires seven encrypted keys to be sent: if the 
new keys are respectively F’, K’, N’ and O’ 
then the encrypted keys are {F’}11, {K’}E, 
{K’}F’, {N’}K’. {N’}L, {O’}M and {O’}N’, 
where {X}Y means key X encrypted using key 
Y.  This represents a significant saving on the 
16 keys that would need to be sent if the flat 
key domain of Figure 6a were used.  In general 
for a departing user, (4) above, the rekey cost 
is reduced from N to 1)(log −Nk k where k is 
the out-degree of the tree. 
In the case of compromised keys, (2) above, all 
compromised keys must be rekeyed: The cost 
of this will vary between 1)(log −Nk k  (the 
cost of removing one user) up to 
1
)1(
−
−
k
Nk
 
(assuming all keys in the hierarchy are 
compromised). 
5.3 Rekeying and security policy 
The security policy for each multicast group 
determines the frequency of group key regular 
updates, and whether or not rekeying is 
required for user joins and departs.  As an 
example of this, there are a number of 
alternatives to rekeying on a user depart, and 
these are briefly discussed below.  We assume 
that a user is connected to the satellite network 
via a UES: 
• Do not rekey when a user leaves a 
group: if the UES is trusted not to 
forward data for a multicast group 
then this is the simplest option, 
involving no cost of either network 
traffic or key generation. 
• Disable keys in the UES when it 
leaves the multicast group: the UES is 
trusted to actively destroy the keys it 
holds; once it has done this it is unable 
to decrypt the multicast group traffic. 
• Rekey when a user departs from the 
multicast group: this is option (4) 
above.  Although it is the most secure 
alternative, it has the disadvantage that 
when there are a large number of 
group members, changing the key on 
each departure may be a heavy 
processing load on the GES key 
server, and is unlikely to scale. 
• Periodic rekeying: this is different 
from option (1) above, since here the 
intention is to bundle together a 
number of departing users and 
effectively rekey them simultaneously.  
This reduces the total rekey workload 
and increases the scalability of the 
multicast group, especially large 
dynamic groups, as has been 
illustrated by the Kronos system [SETI 
00]. 
5.4 Applicability to satellites 
A satellite system provides a further 
opportunity to reduce the rekey costs.  
Geostationary satellites transmit using a 
number of spotbeams.  For a typical satellite 
currently under design there may be of the 
order of 50 to 300 such spotbeams.  Let there 
be S spotbeams, and assume there is a different 
key hierarchy in each spotbeam (Figure 7).  
Then if a single user in one spotbeam departs 
from the group, the hierarchical tree only 
needs to be rekeyed in that spotbeam and, 
assuming the N users to be evenly spread over 
the spotbeams, the rekey cost is: 
SkNk
S
Nk kkk log1log1log −−=−


. 
However, although the rekey cost is reduced 
significantly there is an S-fold increase in the 
volume of uplink traffic from the source, since 
each of the S spotbeams has a different group 
key (keys C, F and I in Figure 7).  This is a 
major cost for a satellite system and would not 
be a worthwhile tradeoff.  It also breaks the 
multicast paradigm that only a single copy of 
each packet is sent on any individual link. 
However, an alternative that has the reduced 
rekey cost while retaining the multicast 
paradigm is to implement packet replication 
and re-encryption on-board the satellite.  This 
option would be particularly appropriate for an 
IP-router-in-the-sky as described in section 
2.4.  A single copy of each packet is sent on 
the uplink to the satellite, encrypted with some 
group key.  On the satellite S copies are made 
and each copy of the packet is re-encrypted 
with the group key for a single spotbeam.  
Each spotbeam then transmits the packets; 
they all have the same data but are encrypted 
with different group keys.  Traffic is 
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maintained at a minimum on each uplink and 
downlink, but at the cost of increased 
processing load on-board the satellite, and a 
small increase in the delay due to re-
encryption.  This delay would be negligible 
compared to the satellite’s propagation delay. 
6 Conclusions 
This paper has presented multicast issues over 
satellites and has discussed satellite 
networking and technologies, including IP, 
ATM, DVB, and on-board processing and 
switching. 
The research work in this paper has described 
the multicast and security challenges for GEO 
satellites, where there are various security 
standards that can be applied to satisfy some 
of the security requirements for such networks.  
DVB-S provides a conditional access system 
to control broadcasts such as pay-satellite-TV, 
but does not fit very well with IP multicast 
applications and architectures.  On the other 
hand, DVB-RCS provides more advanced 
security procedures for satellite terminal 
authentication and key exchanges with the 
network operator.  However it does not 
provide security procedures for 
communications between satellite terminals. 
The DVB-RCS standard allows the use of 
ATM cell transmission over satellites.  The 
ATM Forum has published the ATM security 
specifications, which mainly targets terrestrial 
ATM networks. However overlaps in 
authentication and key exchange exist between 
ATMSec and DVB-RCS, and duplication of 
these components should be avoided.  This 
paper describes a satellite ATM system that 
provides authentication and key exchange 
protocols for master and session keys. 
This paper also examines the issue of securing 
very large multicast groups, where the group 
size and group dynamics have great impact on 
the key management distribution system.  This 
paper provides a hierarchical key distribution 
architecture together with policy options for 
re-keying when a member join or leave in 
addition to periodic re-keying. 
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